In the end it had to be negotiations headed by the United States that broke the political logjam in Honduras between the deposed and the de facto presidents.
With barely a month left before the presidential elections, it was imperative to regularize, insofar as possible, the political crisis, to keep it from tarnishing the next president. This led the administration of Roberto Micheletti to accept the bases of the San José accord, to return Mel Zelaya to power but forbidding him to seek reelection, among other things. In this case, the final word falls to the Congress, which must ratify the agreement next Tuesady.
Apparently it was the press of time which led Micheletti to change. He had previously used constitutional arguments to reject quite similar points to the ones he has now accepted. Clearly, his arguments were part of a delaying strategy.
Zelaya’s return to power would, for all practical effects, be a Pyrrhic victory, as indeed he will share the government he will head only until January. At the same time, it is a powerful signal that coups d’etat against constitutional presidents will not be tolerated in Latin America in the 21st Century.
At first glance it would seem that the American mission managed to do what other countries and international organizations could not. In reality, the key was worldwide pressure that eventually had the desired effect on Micheletti’s administration, which had ridiculously defended the banishment of a president as if it were in the Constitution. Nevertheless, it is still unclear whether the people who supported the coup got the lesson that it is not to be repeated.
In summary, the Hondurans are the main beneficiaries of this agreement. They can go undistracted to the polls in the forthcoming presidential election. We hope they can think about the future without the burden of the past.
In the end it had to be negotiations headed by the United States that broke the political logjam in Honduras between the deposed and the de facto presidents.
With barely a month left before the presidential elections, it was imperative to regularize, insofar as possible, the political crisis, to keep it from tarnishing the next president. This led the administration of Roberto Micheletti to accept the bases of the San José accord, to return Mel Zelaya to power but forbidding him to seek reelection, among other things. In this case, the final word falls to the Congress, which must ratify the agreement next Tuesady.
Apparently it was the press of time which led Micheletti to change. He had previously used constitutional arguments to reject quite similar points to the ones he has now accepted. Clearly, his arguments were part of a delaying strategy.
Zelaya’s return to power would, for all practical effects, be a Pyrrhic victory, as indeed he will share the government he will head only until January. At the same time, it is a powerful signal that coups d’etat against constitutional presidents will not be tolerated in Latin America in the 21st Century.
At first glance it would seem that the American mission managed to do what other countries and international organizations could not. In reality, the key was worldwide pressure that eventually had the desired effect on Micheletti’s administration, which had ridiculously defended the banishment of a president as if it were in the Constitution. Nevertheless, it is still unclear whether the people who supported the coup got the lesson that it is not to be repeated.
